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ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN AND THE COLLATERAL USE OF PRIOR
MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS OF INDIGENTS UNREPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL AT TRIAL
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently formulated a new rule
of criminal procedure regarding the constitutionality of uncounseled mis-
demeanor trials. In Argersinger v. Hamlin,1 the Court examined the
guarantees of the sixth amendment 2 respecting court-appointed counsel
for indigent defendants charged with a misdemeanor.' It held that, "ab-
sent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for
any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial.' 4  This rule of criminal proce-
1407 U.S. 25 (1972), rev'g 236 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1970). Argersinger, an indigent, was
convicted without counsel of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to serve ninety
days in jail. He brought a habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme Court alleging
that denial of court-appointed counsel to an indigent like himself resulted in his Inability
to present an adequate defense to the charges. The Florida Supreme Court discharged the
writ, holding that the right to court-appointed counsel extends only to offenses punishable
by more than six months imprisonment.
2 Argersinger technically involves the guarantees of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment since the case concerns a state prosecution rather than a federal one.
Nevertheless, Justice Douglas focuses on the sixth amendment, incorporating its requirements
into the fourteenth amendment.
There is uncertainty regarding the scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel In
federal cases. One analysis relies on Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), to support
the proposition that the sixth amendment guarantees the right to court appointed counsel
in all federal trials, including misdemeanors. Although the Court's language supports tills
broad in:erpretation, the facts of Johnson involved a felony. Thus a second anaysis is
possible, limiting the constitutional right to court appointed counsel to federal felonies,
The issue has become dormant because FED. R. CriM. P, 44(a) guarantees the right to
counsel in all federal criminal cases tried in district courts, based on the analysis that the
sixth amendment requires it. See 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 44 (1961), Notes of Advisory Committee
on Rules, n.1; 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 44 (Supp. Pamph. 1961-1970), Notes of Advisory Commit,
tee on Rules (regarding 1966 amendments to Rule 44). However, the recent adoption
of the Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Minor Offenses before United States Magistrates
reaffirms the unsettled scope of the right to counsel in federal cases; although mentioned,
the right to counsel is not firmly guaranteed. See FED. R. P. for the TRIAL O MINOR
OFFENSES BEFORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES 2(b), 3.
3 Prior development of the right to court-appointed counsel: Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932), held that an indigent person. charged with a capital offense, who Is unable
to adequately make his own defense, has the right to court-appointed counsel; Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that any indigent person charged with a felony
has the right to a court-appointed counsel (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), held that the sixth amendment required appoint.
ment of counsel in federal criminal cases where the defendant is unable to procure legal
services on his own.
4 407 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added). Analyses of the background, majority and concurring
opinions, possible expansion, and the effect of Argersinger may be found in the following-
Note, The Indigent's Expanding Right to Appointed Counsel, 37 ALiDANY L. REV, 383
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dure has recently been applied retroactively in Berry v. Cincinnati.5
Thus if an indigente was convicted of a misdemeanor without counsel
at trial and sentenced to imprisonment,7 representation by counsel, unless
waived,' is constitutionally required regardless of when the conviction
occurred.
By framing the holding in this manner, the Court created a doctrine
whose imperfections may return to haunt it. The holding is narrow;
it creates only the negative right not to go to jail without counsel at trial,
rather than the affirmative right to counsel. It fails to speak to the con-
stitutionality of the underlying conviction. Relying on the type of sen-
tence to determine the applicability of the rule, the Court abandoned
(1973); 18 VILL. L. REV. 750 (1973); 41 FoRDHAm L REV. 722 (1973); 77 DicK. L
REV. 176 (1972); 47 TUL. L REv. 446 (1973).
5414 U.S. 29 (1973). The Court did not elaborate on the reason for applying Arger-
singer retroactively. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1965), the Supreme
Court concluded that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are neither required
to be made retroactive, nor prohibited from being so applied. The Court looks to each
case and weighs the merits and demerits of retroactivity on the basis of these factors: "a)
the purpose to be served by the new standards, b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and c) the effect on the administration of justice . . . :"
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). However, the Court has excluded any consider-
ation of the second and third criteria if the major purpose of the new criminal rule is
to enhance the reliability of the judgment at trial. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S.
646, 653 (1971). Neither good faith reliance nor dilatory effects on the administration
of justice can suffice to deny retroactivity if the new constitutional standard creates serious
doubts regarding the accuracy of guilty verdicts in previous trials without this new standard.
Although recently re-affirming this single prong test in Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278
(1972), the Court has not strictly applied it to all new rules of criminal procedure whose
aim was to enhance the accuracy of trial verdicts. E.g., Stovall v. Denno, supra (denying
retroactivity to the right to counsel at lineup in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),
and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S 263 (1967). The right to counsel at /rida, however, has
been cited as an example of the proper application of the single prong test. Adams v. Illi-
nois, supra at 280-81.
Presumably, the unreliability of uncounseled misdemeanor trials which result in imprison-
ment necessitated retroactive application of Argersinger. See text accompanying notes 10-16
infra.
(;No standard definition of an indigent exists. Justice Powell, concurring in the result
of Argersinger, noted that some inequities may result due to differing criteria states use
to judge indigency; a person may be deemed an indigent by one state and appointed counsel,
although another under similar circumstances may not be deemed indigent by a different
state, and therefore not constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel. 407 U.S. at
49-50 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). Argersinger does not speak directly to this
problem.
7 Argersinger requires actual imprisonment to invoke the right to counsel. For purposes
of this note, it will be presumed that a person sentenced to imprisonment was actually
imprisoned, though such is not always the case if, for example, probation or a suspended
sentence was granted. See Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1973), va-
cated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 895 (1973), in which Argersinger was held inapplicable to
a misdemeanor conviction with a twenty day suspended sentence.
8 An indigent defendant may "knowing[ly] and intelligentEly]" waive his constitutional
right to the provisions of the Argersinger ruling. 407 U.S. at 37. What elements comprise
such a waiver may be the subject of dispute. For the purposes of this note, it shall be
presumed that no valid waiver exists.
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the reasoning which supposedly necessitated its decision. The dichotomy
created between the Court's reasoning and its holding paved the way
for some illogical consequences.
Among its other imperfections, Argersinger raises difficulties with re-
spect to the use of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions in collateral
criminal proceedings. This note will consider whether any restrictions
should be imposed on the collateral use of such convictions. In this
context, uncounseled convictions with imprisonment and without impris-
onment will be analyzed separately. As will be discussed, the use of un-
counseled misdemeanor convictions resulting in imprisonment, controlled
by Argersinger, should be retroactively prohibited in collateral proceed-
ings. Uncounseled convictions without imprisonment, though not invali-
dated by Argersinger, may also be restricted in their collateral use. Be-
cause the Argersinger Court neglected these issues, further review by the
Court is necessary. An affirmative right to counsel would best resolve
these questions.
II. ANALYSIS OF ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN
The Supreme Court's Argersinger opinion stops short of granting an
affirmative right to counsel. The Court utilized the sentence to deter-
mine whether a misdemeanant had the right to court-appointed counsel
at trial. When the sentence is imprisonment, the right to counsel vests
and the misdemeanant may not be imprisoned unless he had counsel at
trial. However, the Court failed to articulate whether or not the underly-
ing conviction is constitutional when imprisonment is imposed. Thus
the opinion is subject to two interpretations.
The first interpretation is that Argersinger applies only to sentencing
and upholds the constitutionality of uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tions. This narrow view rests primarily on the language "no person may
be imprisoned ...unless ...represented by counsel . . . ." Thus,
it can be argued, the Court merely restricted the sentencing options avail-
able if the trial was uncounseled; it did not mandate the appointment
of counsel. This position leads to the paradoxical conclusion that a mis-
demeanor conviction obtained without counsel is constitutionally valid
even though a sentence of imprisonment is not.
The better analysis is that Argersinger applies to both the misdemea-
nor conviction and the sentence of imprisonment, constitutionally invali-
dating both if the indigent defendant is unrepresented by counsel at trial.
This view, which avoids an illogical application of the narrow holding,
is supported by the Court's rationale.
1 Argersinger v. Harnlin, 407 U.S. at 37.
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Although the narrow Argersinger holding focuses on the sentence,
the Court formulated this holding through an examination of the entire
trial process. In the majority opinion, Justice Douglas concluded that,
as in felony cases, "the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty
offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a
fair trial."'10 The questions presented in a misdemeanor case are often
too complicated and complex for even an educated lay person, much less
one under-educated; guilty pleas often are entered in misdemeanor cases
which require complete awareness by the defendant of all the ramifica-
tions of such a plea, and crowded court dockets add pressure for quick
disposition of a case with the result that a fair trial often becomes a
lost goal.
Moreover, the majority specifically recognized the unreliability of a
trial conducted without counsel. Quoting from Powell v. Alabama,"- it
noted that the assistance of counsel is needed to insure a fair trial because
"[w]ithout it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence." The Court
then quoted from the American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Counsel for
MAisdemeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970) to show statistical support
for the unreliability of a trial without counsel.12  Thus the Court con-
cluded that sentencing a misdemeanant to prison without representation
at trial is unconstitutional because it stems from an unfair trial and there-
fore an unreliable conviction.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, each writing opinions con-
curring in the result, also viewed the inadequacies of an uncounseled
trial as the rationale behind the Argersinger holding. Chief Justice Bur-
ger said: "The issues that must be dealt with in a trial for a petty of-
fense or a misdemeanor may... be beyond the capability of a layman,
especially when he is opposed by a law-trained prosecutor."" Justice
Powell, while criticizing the majority for formulating an arbitrary and
rigid rule,14 also framed his discussion around the fairness of an uncoun-
10 Id. at 36-37.
11Id. at 31, quoting from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
-12 "[MIisdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from
police court with all charges dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without
counsel." Id. at 36.
13 Id. at 41 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the result).
14 Id. at 47-52 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). Justice Powell proposed a mase
by case balancing approach:
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty offense cases is not absolute but is
one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a case-
by-case basis. The determination should be made before the accused formally
pleads; ... If the trial court should conclude that the assistance of counsel is not
1974]
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seled trial: "Many petty offenses will . . . present complex legal and
factual issues that may not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted
by counsel." '5
Therefore, the analysis of the holding in Argersinger which finds
most support in the language of the opinion is that counsel at trial must
be provided to an indigent charged with a misdemeanor in order constitu-
tionally to convict and sentence him 'if the sentence is imprisonment.
Argersinger should apply not only to the sentence, but also to the under-
lying conviction if the sentence is imprisonment.
Most courts which have considered sentences potentially in violation
of the Argersinger rule' have framed their discussions in terms of the
validity of the conviction and the sentence without giving explicit con-
sideration to the issue of restricting Argersinger to the sentence.11 Two
courts of appeal, however, have indicated adherence to the view that Ar-
gersinger applies only to the sentence. In Marston v. Oliver,'8 the
Fourth Circuit reversed a district court ruling which invalidated an un-
counseled misdemeanor conviction resulting in imprisonment: "In Arger-
singer, . . . the Court only invalidated any imprisonment flowing from
the conviction; it left intact and outstanding the conviction itself."' 0 The
court allowed the conviction to be used collaterally to revoke the defen-
dant's driver's license for ten years. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit, in
Sweeten v. Sneddon,20 reversed an injunction against a state misdemeanor
prosecution in which the penalty could have been imprisonment and the
state court had refused to appoint counsel. The court concluded that
an injunction would go beyond the mandate of Argersinger. Since Ar-
required in any case, it should state its reasons so that the issue could be pre-
served for review.
Id. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
15 Id. at 47 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
-
0 See Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds,
414 U.S. 895 (1973); Wood v. Superintendent, 355 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1973); Cordle v,
Woody, 350 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Va. 1972); United States v. Alderman, 22 US.C.M.A.
298 (1973); Exparte Webster, 497 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); o. Clay v. Wain-
wright, 470 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1972).
17 In United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 304-06 (1973), Judge Duncan,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, recognized this narrow analysis of Argiringer
and specifically rejected it. He observed that if only the sentence is to be Invalid, then
logically the sixth amendment right to be represented by counsel could be satisfied by repre-
sentation during the sentencing procedure. To the contrary, he finds much support in Arger,
singer that the Court was looking at the effect of counsel on the fairness of the entire trial,
not simply the sentencing process. Further, Judge Duncan cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), to support his rejection of this
narrow analysis. Contra, id. at 309-10 (Darden, C.J., dissenting).
18 485 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1973).
19 Id. at 707.
20 463 F.2d 713, 715-16 (10th Cit. 1972).
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gersinger premised its ruling on a sentence of imprisonment, presumably
the court thought it was premature to invoke Argersinger before the
trial.21  But the court went further: "Argersinger forbids imprisonment
without representation. It does not forbid trial without representation."22
Although on the facts of Sweeten the court was not concerned with an
uncounseled conviction, the implication of its statement is that it per-
ceived Argersinger to apply only to the sentencing process.
The immutable imperfection in Argersinger stems from the Court's
use of the sentence to invoke the right to court-appointed counsel. The
unfairness of a misdemeanor trial without counsel is the basic reason
for the Court's holding. Yet it abandoned this reasoning when it at-
tached the right to counsel to the type of sentence imposed. As a result,
a basic dichotomy exists within Argersinger that forces an illogical and
unsound situation. Two indigents, for example, might each be convicted
at an uncounseled trial, before the same judge, for the same misdemean-
or. At this point the constitutionality of each trial cannot be determined,
even though the trials are over. Not until the sentence is pronounced
may the trial-already completed-become unfair. If one misdemeanant
is sentenced to imprisonment, then the nature of his trial is retroactively
branded as unfair. If the other misdemeanant is only fined, however,
then his trial is fair. The characteristics of two trials, though substantial-
ly the same, are both fair and unfair; the constitutionality of each depends
on an event not even occurring at the trial. This result illustrates that
the Court's reasoning behind Argersinger and its holding do not coalesce.
Aside from the possibility of this curious result, the Court's focus
on the sentence creates serious problems of implementation.2 The trial
judge must assess the gravity and seriousness of the offense before com-
mencing the trial to determine whether imprisonment should be retained
as an available option for sentencing. In other words, the judge must
guess whether he will impose imprisonment as a sentence if the defen-
dant is convicted. Thus the decision whether to appoint counsel is neces-
2
"Mabler v. Birnbaum, 95 Idaho 14, 501 P.2d 282 (1972) (denying writ of mandate
to compel appointment of counsel in state prosecution for misdemeanor), takes this approach.
2 2 Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir. 1972).
23The majority opinion devotes minimum attention to how the Argerringer holding
will be implemented. 407 U.S. at 40. Justice Powell, however, discussed this topic in
greater detail and pointed out several problems: once counsel is not appointed, even if
facts appear to warrant it, no imprisonment may be imposed; possible equal protection
problems may arise if a defendant charged with one offense has appoinzed counsel, although
another defendant in the same court, charged with the same offense, does not have appointed
counsel; if an indigent is convicted without counsel, and he could not afford to pay a fine, no
meaningful sentence is left. 407 U.S. at 52-59 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). Chief
Justice Burger discusses possible methods of implementing the predetermination required by
the Argersinger ruling. 407 U.S. at 42-44 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the result). Articles
previously listed in note 4 supra, also discuss this problem.
1974]
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sarily made without knowledge of what sentence, if any, will eventually
be imposed. Yet it is the sentence that determines whether counsel is
constitutionally required. These problems could have been avoided, or
at least diminished, by structuring some form of a positive right to coun-
sel wherein determination of whether or not counsel is constitutionally
required could be made before trial.24 Yet the Court did not do so.
The Court's development of a doctrine which creates not only illogi-
cal consequences but also serious problems of implementation demands
explanation. It cannot be defended by asserting that the Court was
forced to focus on imprisonment because it had already concluded that
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions involving no loss of liberty are
constitutional..25  Language in the opinion itself contradicts this theory:
"We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as
regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, how-
ever, for here, petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail."20  Further, al-
though the majority opinion acknowledged and refuted Justice Powell's
criticism that there are too few attorneys to implement the Argersinger
rule,27 no similar refutation accompanied acknowledgement of Justice
Powell's suggestion that counsel should be required in some non-impris-
onment misdemeanor cases.- Thus the Court indicated a willingness
to challenge criticism of the practicality of its holding, but an unwilling-
ness to contradict Justice Powell's assessment of the constitutional re-
quirement for counsel in some non-imprisonment misdemeanor trials.
In addition, the Court drew no distinction between the inherent na-
ture of uncounseled misdemeanor trials resulting in loss of liberty and
24 The Court had other alternatives available, which apparently were rejected-
(1) absolute right to counsel for indigents charged with a misdemeanor wherein impris.
onment is statutorily possible, regardless of the actual sentence. The states, then, could rc'
draft their criminal statutes to eliminate imprisonment as a potential sentence for offenses for
which imprisonment is seldom, if ever, imposed. See Oral Argument of Argeriinger v, Ham-
lin, 10 CRIM. L. REP. 4098.
(2) absolute right to counsel forindigents charged with a misdemeanor offense for whldch
imprisonment of six months or more is statutorily permissible, regardless of the actual sen.
tence; no imprisonment, however, could be imposed unless counsel at trial was provided,
This is the approach taken by the OHIO R. GRIM. P. 44.
2 5 Wood v. Superintendent, 355 F. Supp. 338, 343 (E.D. Va. 1973), also rejected this
theory, conduding that "[n]othing in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court suggests
this result, this Court can but only conclude that the Supreme Court has chosen not to
deal with this issue at the present time."
2 0 Argersinger v. H4amlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
27 Id. at 37 n.7.
281d. at 37. Justice Powell concluded that complex legal and factual issues may be
raised in these cases. He cited loss of one's driver's license in some situations (e.g., where
needed for employment) and the stigma attached to some charges (e.g., drunken driving
and hit-and-run) as examples of consequences as serious as imprisonment. Id. at 48 (Powell,
J., concurring in the result).
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those not resulting in loss of liberty. Certainly guilty pleas and crowded
dockets, cited by the Court as reasons for its decision, affect all misde-
meanor trials regardless of the sentence. Therefore, the Court's focus
on sentencing cannot be explained by asserting the Court concluded that
only uncounseled misdemeanor trials resulting in loss of liberty are inher-
ently unconstitutional.
A tenable theory is that the Court focused on the sentencing process
to balance the competing views that all indigents charged with a misde-
meanor have a right to court-appointed counsel under the sixth amend-
ment because uncounseled trials are unfair and unreliable 20 and that the
administration of justice would be adversely affected by such a broad
extension of the right to counsel.30  After weighing the competing views,
the Court drew the line where actual imprisonment results.
This theory is supported by language in the last paragraph of the
opinion: "The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today's ruling.
But in those that end up in actual deprivation of a person's liberty, the
accused will receive the benefit of 'the guiding hand of counsel' so neces-
sary when one's liberty is in jeopardy."3'1 Moreover, the majority's dis-
tinction between actual and potential imprisonment also indicates the
Court's balancing approach. If the Court decided that one should not
go to jail based on an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, but was also
concerned about the potential detrimental effect of a broad extension of
the right to court-appointed counsel, it would be logical to restrict the
right to counsel to those cases involving actual imprisonment, rather than
formulating a right to counsel whenever imprisonment is statutorily per-
missable. In this manner, the Court would be formulating a new rule
of criminal procedure which would have the least impact on the adminis-
tration of criminal justice.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion also indicates the Court's dual
concern for the fairness of an individual trial and the timely administra-
tion of the criminal justice system: "[T]oday's decision could have a seri-
ously adverse impact upon the day to day functioning of the criminal jus-
tice system. We should be slow to fashion a new constitutional rule
with consequences of such unknown dimensions, especially since it is sup-
29 Id. at 29-38.
301d. at 56-62 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). The primary fear of a broad
extension of the right to counsel is the unavailability of attorneys to meet the need. If
not enough attorneys were available for those indigents who desired one, trials would have
to be postponed until counsel was available, thus slowing down the already creaky wheels
of justice.
31 Id. at 40.
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ported neither by history nor precedent." 2  The Argersinger Court ap.
parently heeded Justice Powell's advice.
Ill. RESTRICTIONS ON THE COLLATERAL USE Or,
UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS
In Argersinger the Supreme Court did not consider the issue of collat-
eral use of previous uncounseled misdemeanor convictions. Nevertheless,
without the development of restrictions on such collateral use, Arger-
singer would be vitiated; such restrictions could indirectly affect every
indigent convicted at an uncounseled trial in contrast to the direct impact
of Argersinger only on those indigents still imprisoned as the result of
an uneounseled misdemeanor trial. Because Argersinger was limited to
sentences of imprisonment, a distinction must be made between convic-
tions which result in imprisonment and those which do not. The pre-
vious analysis of Argersinger provides a basis for restricting the collateral
use of convictions invalidated by it. However, the application of the
Argersinger rationale to restrict the collateral use of convictions not re-
sulting in loss of liberty is open to debate.
A. Convictions invalidated by Argersinger
Because Argersinger invalidates both the conviction and the sentence,
convictions in violation of its rule should not be subsequently used to
enhance punishment for a different offense, to revoke probation, parole
or a suspended sentence, or to impeach a defendant's testimony in a trial
for a separate offense.
1. Use of Invalid Convictions to Enhance Punishment
In most states, prior misdemeanor convictions may enhance the pun-
ishment of a subsequent offense in two ways:33 (1) the statutory upgrad-
ing of the classification of an offense because of these prior misdemeanor
convictions,3 and (2) the discretionary consideration by the judge in de.
32 Id. at 52 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
33 Recidivist statutes typically prescribe an increased maximum penalty for certain grave
offenses committed by "habitual criminals." The constitutionality of such statutes has been
upheld in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1967). See, eg., OHIO REV, CODE
ANN. §§ 2961.11-.13 (Page, 1954) (repealed by H.B. 511, eff. 1-1-1974, which enacted
the new Ohio Criminal Code). Typically, these types of statutes refer to offenses of a grave
nature. But should a misdemeanor conviction be included in a recidivist statute, it would in.
crease the penalty and therefore be subject to the same analysis as other methods of enhancing
punishment relying upon previous misdemeanor convictions. S'ee generally ILLINOIs LiGIS-
LATIVE COUNCIL, HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE S (Publication #122, 1955); 53 CORNELL
L. REV. 337 (1968).
84 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 § 11-20(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973-1974) (making
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termining the sentence. 35 The new Ohio Criminal Code, 0 for example,
incorporates both of these methods. Statutes upgrading the crime classi-
fication prescribe one degree of offense for the first violation and another
degree of offense if the defendant has previously been convicted of certain
other offenses or types of offenses.37 As a result, a more severe penalty
is statutorily permissible,38 though the judge still retains discretion in set-
ting the actual sentence.
Regardless whether or not the classification of the offense has been
upgraded, certain previous misdemeanor convictions are statutorily re-
quired to be considered by the judge under the new Ohio Criminal Code.
In determining the sentence, a judge must consider whether a convicted
defendant is a "repeat offender," defined as "a person who has a history
of persistent criminal activity and whose character and condition reveal
a substantial risk that he will commit another offense."3 9  Prima facie
evidence that a person is a repeat offender includes the previous convic-
tion and imprisonment for certain misdemeanors.4 0  If the convicted de-
the offense of obscenity a class A misdemeanor on first offense, and a class 4 felony on
second offense); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 265.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 1973-1974) (making
the offense of illegal possession of weapons a class A misdemeanor, but a class D felony
if previously convicted of any crime); CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1970) (making
indecent exposure a misdemeanor on first offense and a felony on second or subsequent
offenses). See also 24 OKLA. L. REV. 372, 376-80 (1971).
35 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 § 1005-3-2 (Smith-Hurd 1973) (regarding pre-
sentence report which includes information of prior record); N.Y. CR~h(. PROC. LAW §
390.20 and § 390.30 (McKinrey 1971) (regarding pre-sentence reports which include infor-
mation of prior convictions); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West Supp. 1973) (regarding
pre-sentence investigations in order to determine whether to grant probation); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 13 (West 1970) (granting the sentencing judge wide discretion in determining the
sentence within the limits set by statute).
3GThe new Ohio Criminal Code, LB. 511, became effective on January 1, 1974.
3 7 E.g., violation of Olo REV. CODE 2913.03(A) (H.B. 511, eff. 1-1-1974) is upgraded
from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the fourth degree if "the offender
has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or of any other theft offense ....
OMiO REV. CODE 2913.03(D) (H.B. 511, eff. 1-1-1974).
3 8 E.g., misdemeanors of the first degree carry a possible maximum penalty of six months
imprisonment, or $1,000 fine, or both. Ohio REV. CODE § 2929.21(B)(1) and (C)(1) (H.B.
511, eff. 1-1-1974). But felonies of the fourth degree carry a minimum sentence of six
months imprisonment, with a maximum of five years, or a possible maximum fine of $2,500,
or both. Omuo REV. CODE § 2929.11(B)(4) and (C)(4) (-LB. 511, eff. 1-1-1974).
39 0mo REv. CODE § 2929.01(A) (H.B. 511, eff. 1-1-1974).
40OFHo REV. CODE § 2929.01(A)(2)(3) and (5) (I-LB. 511, eft. 1-1-1974). If the
present conviction is for a sex offense, as defined by OHIO REV. CODE § 2950.01(B)(1)
(H.B. 511, eff. 1-1-1974), prima fade evidence of the status of a "repeat offender" includes
conviction and imprisonment for one or more sex offenses, some of which are misdemeanors.
See, e.g., OMo REV. CODE §§ 2907.08 to .09 (H.B. 511, elf. 1-1-1974). If the present
conviction is for a theft offense, as defined by Oaso REV. CODE § 2913.01(K) (H.B. 511,
eft. 1-1-1974), prima fade evidence of the status of a "repeat offender" includes convictions
and imprisonment for one or more theft offenses, some of which are misdemeanors. See,
e.g., Omo REV. CODE §§ 2913.02 to .04 (H.B. 511, eff. 1-1-1974). And, regardless of
the present conviction, prima fade evidence of the status of a "repeat offender" includes
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fendant is considered a repeat offender, imprisonment rather than a fine
is favored 4' in misdemeanor cases. In felony cases, it may warrant a
longer term. 2
These collateral uses of previous convictions to enhance punishment
should be disallowed if the previous conviction is constitutionally invalid
under Argersinger. Two Supreme Court cases concerning an analogous
situation support this conclusion. In Burgett v. Texas,48 previous uncoun.
seled felony convictions, invalid under Gideon v. Wrainwright,4" were in-
troduced into evidence pursuant to a Texas recidivist statute. Although
the previous convictions had no apparent effect on the length of the sen-
tence,45 the Supreme Court46 stated in dictum its view that: "To permit
a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. lrainwright to be used
against a person ...to ...enhance punishment for another offense
...is to erode the principle of that case."47  Five years later in United
States v. Tucker,48 previous uncounseled felony convictions were given
weight by the trial judge in sentencing the defendant to the maximum
term authorized by the statute. 49  The Supreme Court, in Tucker, rea-
soned that since Townsend v. Burke 0 prohibited sentencing based upon
an erroneous record, consideration of previous convictions which were
now invalid under Gideon was reversible error.,' The Court emphasized
that such convictions must have been relied upon by the judge in the
determination of the present sentence before reconsideration of the sen-
tence would be necessary.5 2 The prohibition on the use of prior convic-
tions, invalid under Gideon, to enhance the punishment of subsequent
convictions6 3 was based on the principle that felony convictions obtained
conviction of three or more offenses (except traffic offenses, alcoholic intoxication offenses,
or minor misdemeanors) and sentence to imprisonment for at least one of these offenses,
which include many misdemeanors. See, e.g., OHIO REV, CODE § 2917.03, § 2921.13,
and § 2921.31 (H.B. 511, eff. 1-1-1974).
4 1 OHIOREV. CODE § 2929.22(B) (H.B. 511, eft. 1-1-1974).
42 OHIo REv. CODE § 2929.12(B) (H.B. 511, eft. 1-1-1974).
43 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
44 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45 The actual sentence imposed was ten years and the recidivist statute would have re-
quired either a twenty five year sentence, or life imprisonment. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.
109, 110 n.1, 111 n.3 (1967).
40The crucial issue in Burget was the prejudicial effect of the previous convictions
on the jury's verdict. See text accompanying notes 65-70 infra.
47 Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. at 115.
48404 U.S. 443 (1972).
4 Id: at 444.
50 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
51 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447-48.
52d. at 448-49.
53 See generally 1 WAsH. U.L.Q. 197, 197-203 (1973).
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without counsel were an unreliable indication of guilt, and therefore con-
stituted an erroneous record.54
A similar argument exists for restricting the collateral use of misde-
meanor convictions, invalid under Argersinger, to enhance punishment.
Like Gideon, the Argersinger holding was also based on a finding that
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions which result in imprisonment are
unreliable because they stem from an unfair trial. Thus any sentence
which was influenced by an invalid misdemeanor conviction would also
violate the Townsend prohibition on sentencing based on an erroneous
record. In order to avoid such a result, resentencing should be constitu-
tionally required if it can be shown that invalid misdemeanor convictions.
influenced the judge's determination of the type or length of sentence.
Although few courts have yet dealt with the admissibility of evidence
of an invalid previous misdemeanor conviction, the United States Court
of Military Appeals, in United States v. Aldernan,55 has applied the
Tucker holding to military convictions held to be in violation of Arger-
singer. Concluding that the trial judge "gave effect to the previous con-
victions," the court held that "if either of the convictions is invalid be-
cause the accused was deprived of the right to counsel, the sentence must
be reassessed."5' 6 Even though the Burgett and Tucker holdings would
not prohibit the use of invalid convictions if they had no effect on the
sentence, a logical policy for the future would prohibit all use of previous
convictions constitutionally invalid under Argersinger.
2. Use of Invalid Convictions to Revoke Probation, Parole or a
Suspended Sentence
A misdemeanor conviction may also be used collaterally to justify
the revocation of probation, parole or a suspended sentence imposed as
a result of a conviction on a separate offense. The previous analysis
regarding enhanced punishment is equally applicable in these situations.
Burgett and Tucker indicate that constitutionally invalid convictions con-
stitute an erroneous record which may not be used collaterally. Since
Argersinger held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction which re-
sults in imprisonment is an unreliable determination of guilt, and there-
fore constitutionally invalid, it follows that such convictions may not be
used collaterally as the basis for the revocation of probation, parole, or
54 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447-48; Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. at 114-16.
5522 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 302-03 (1973). Accord, Maghe v. State, 507 P.2d 950 (Okla.
Crim. 1973).
56 Id. at 303.
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a suspended sentence. The revocation should be vacated and reconsidera-
tion given without reference to any invalid convictions.
Following an approach similar to the previous analysis regarding en-
hanced punishment, the Fifth Circuit, in Clay v. Wainwright,57 held that
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions found to be in violation of Arger-
singer were insufficient to support revocation of probation which had
been granted on a previous felony conviction. Upon concluding that
the invalid convictions had some effect not only on the probation revoca-
tion, but also on the judgment and sentence following the revocation,
the court ordered all revoked."' The court reasoned: "[I]f the sentencing
judge had been aware of the constitutional infirmity of these convictions
the circumstances of ... the defendant's behavior on probation might
'have appeared in a dramatically different light at the sentencing proceed-
ing.' "" The Fifth Circuit summarily extended this analysis to parole re-
vocations in Cottle v. Wainwright,° citing Clay as support for their con-
clusion: "Perhaps needless to say, one's parole cannot be revoked on the
basis of prior invalid convictions."61 Although no court has directly dealt
with the revocation of a suspended sentence based on invalid misdemean-
or convictions, a similar result should follow since the circumstances are
sufficiently analogous to probation and parole revocations. 52  Thus a mis-
demeanor conviction obtained in violation of the Argersinger rule should
be restricted from indirectly resulting in loss of liberty.
57 470 F.2d 478,482-84 (5th Cir. 1972).
58 ld. at 482, 484.
59 Id. at 484.
60 477 F.2d 269, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 895 (1973).
The rejection of an application for parole based on consideration of previous invalid misde-
meanor convictions should also be re-considered, following the same reasoning. Cordle v.
Woody, 350 F. Supp. 479, 481 (ED. Va. 1972). See generally R. DAWSON, SENTIINC-
ING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDmTIONS oi SENTENCE, 263-73 (1969).
61 Cottle v, Wainwright, 477 F.2d at 275.
62 But cf. Cordle v. Woody, 350 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Va. 1972). Plaintiff was convicted
on January 26, 1971, of grand larceny and was given a suspended sentence of three years,
On February 26, 1971, plaintiff was convicted without counsel of a misdemeanor and was
sentenced to twelve months in jail and a $100 fine. On March 4, 1971, plaintiff's suspended
sentence on the earlier charge was revoked. The court held that the misdemeanor conviction
without counsel was invalid under Argersinger, even though the prison sentence for it had
already been served. The court specifically noted the possible detrimental effect the invalid
misdemeanor conviction might have on plaintiff's chances for parole on the grand larceny
sentence. Thus it would appear that the court accepted the rationale of Tucker and Burgett,
The court, however, made no mention of a re-consideration of the suspended sentence revoca-
tion, a procedure which would also conform with the rationale of Tucker and Burgett.
Since the case arose on a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the validity of the misde-
meanor conviction, perhaps the court simply addressed itself ordy to this.
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3. Use of Invalid Convictions to Impeach the Credibility of the
Defendant
In general, if the defendant in a criminal trial testifies on his own
behalf, his prior criminal record may be used to impair his credibility
as a witness, 3 subject to various limitations imposed in different jurisdic-
tions.6 But when misdemeanor convictions, invalid under Argersinger,
are used for impeachment purposes, a new trial should be necessary. In
Burgett v. Texas, 5 admission into evidence of previous felony convictions
was held to be inherently prejudicial to the defendant. Otherwise, said
the Court, indigents convicted of felonies without counsel would be sub-
ject to continued vulnerability flowing from an unreliable determination
of guilt."6 Since the previous convictions in Burgett were introduced to
facilitate a one-stage trial for assault and enhanced punishment under
the state recidivist statute, 7 the issue of impeachment was not directly
faced until five years later in Loper v. Beto. 8 Reaffirming Burgett, the
Court held that constitutionally invalid prior felony convictions may not
be used to impeach the credibility of defendant's testimony."' But the
error can be harmless if other evidence sufficient to support guilt is pres-
ent.7
0
Although previous misdemeanor convictions may not be as influential
as previous felony convictions in impeaching testimony at a subsequent
trial, if the past misdemeanor convictions are for crimes similar to the
63See McCoRmicK, EvIDENcE 443 (2d ed. 1972); 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 889-
91 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). See generally McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defen.
dants by Prior Convictions, LAw & Soc. ORDER 1 (1970); Cohen, Impeachment of a Deaen-
dant-Witness By Prior Conviction, 6 CRl. L BULL. 26 (1970).
64 Some jurisdictions restrict admissibility of prior crimes to felonies. See, e.g., CAL.
Evm. CODE § 788 (West 1966). Others allow any felony or misdemeanor to be used. See,
e.g., Coslow v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 378, 177 P.2d 518 (1947). Still others pose an addi-
tional requirement that the crime be one of "moral turpitude." See, e.g., Tasker v. Common-
wealth, 202 Va. 1019, 121 S.E. 2d 459 (1961). And others require that prior crimes must
have some probative value to prove the issue involved. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.59 (Page 1954). Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 6-09 would limit admissibility of
prior crimes to those punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or those
involving dishonesty. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 295 et seq. (1969). See also Glick,
Impeachment by Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed Rules of Ei-
dence of US. District Courts, 6 Cyuat. L BULL 330 (1970).
65 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
6 6
"To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used
against a person . . . to support guilt ... is to erode the principle of that case." Id. at 115.
67Id. at 111.
68 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
69 Id. at 483-84.
701d. at 483 n.12; See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. at 115; Hernandez v. Craven, 350
F. Supp. 929, 938-39 (C.D. Calif. 1972).
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one on trial, they may be significant. Unless it could be shown that
the error was not harmless, the use of an invalid misdemeanor conviction
to impeach the credibility of the defendant at a subsequent trial should
be prohibited. Although few courts have ruled on this issue, 1 the un-
constitutionality found in Argersinger was based on the same principle
-as that found in Gideon-an unfair trial results in an unreliable determi
nation of guilt. Therefore, the restrictions developed in Burgett and Lo.
pet, are equally applicable to protect those unconstitutionally convicted
of a misdemeanor from further pejorative effects.
B. Convictions Not Invalidated by Argersinger
Under Argersinger uncounseled misdemeanor convictions of indigents
are still constitutionally valid if imprisonment is not imposed. Even
though these convictions do not initially result in loss of liberty,, however,
they may affect future proceedings so as to have a delayed impact on
liberty. Uncounseled misdemeanor convictions not invalidated by Arger-
singer may indirectly lead to loss of liberty in three ways. The first
two involve the collateral use of the prior conviction at a trial for a
subsequent charge. (The prior conviction may have been for an offense
for which only fines were permissible, or for an offense for which impris-
onment, though statutorily allowed, was rejected in favor of a fine.) In
the first situation, the conviction may serve to statutorily upgrade the
classification of the new offense from the lowest class, allowing only fines,
to a higher level, allowing imprisonment.72  Secondly, where the new
offense permits imprisonment, this prior conviction may become a factor
in the discretionary imposition of imprisonment by the trial judge. 8 Un-
71Burford v. State, 515 P.2d 382 (Alaska 1973). In Commonwealth v. Boudreau, 285
N.E.2d 915 (1972), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts by implication supported this con.
clusion. After finding the misdemeanor conviction in question not to be invalidated by
Argersinger as no imprisonment resulted, the court continued "even if such evidence were
erroneously admitted." Id. at 918 (emphasis added).
72 In Ohio, for example, the new Criminal Code provides that offenses classified as minor
misdemeanors may be punishable only by fines up to $100. OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.21(D)
(H.B. 511, eff. 1-1-1974). Some offenses, however, are classified as minor misdemeanors
on the first offense, and statutorily upgraded, for example, to misdemeanors of the fourth
degree upon second or subsequent offenses. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2917.11(E) (H,13.
511, eff. 1-1-1974). All types of misdemeanor offenses in Ohio, except minor misdemeanors,
allow imprisonment as a penalty. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.21(A) (H.D. 511, eff.
1-1-1974). Therefore, one may be constitutionally convicted of a minor misdemeanor with.
out counsel; however, upon a second offense, the first uncounseled conviction could mandate
a statutory upgrading of the type of offense, thus allowing imprisonment as a potential
sentence.
No similar classification exists in New York or California. See N.Y. PElNAL CODE
ANN. § 70.15 (McKinney 1967); CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West 1970).
73 In Ohio, for example, a misdemeanor of any degree may be subject only to a fine
rather than imprisonment. Although such convictions do not constitute prima fade evidence
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less counsel is provided or waived at the trial for the subsequent charge,
Argersinger prohibits imprisonment. But even assuming representation
at the second trial, the issue here revolves around the fact that absent
the prior uncounseled conviction, imprisonment could not or would not
have been imposed.
The third possibility is the case where an indigent, already convicted
of a prior offense, may be subject to the revocation of his probation,
parole or suspended sentence because of an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction where only a fine was imposed. Again, loss of liberty would
be effectuated by the collateral use of uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tions which in themselves involved no loss of liberty.
Such collateral use of constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions must be considered in light of Argersinger. The dichotomy
between the focus on sentencing found in the holding of Argersinger
and the sixth amendment right-to-counsel rationale underlying the hold-
ing permits no resolution of this issue. Two conflicting points of view
may be argued. One approach would place no restriction on the use
of convictions not invalidated by Argersinger. The argument may be
framed in syllogistic fashion: Uncounseled misdemeanor convictions
which do not result in imprisonment are constitutional. Constitutionally
obtained convictions may be used collaterally. Therefore, collateral use
of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions not resulting in imprisonment
is proper. This argument is based on a rigid interpretation of the Court's
holding in Argersinger. Although the major premise of this syllogism
is presently accurate, no Supreme Court decision has specifically held that
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions which do not result in imprison-
ment are constitutional. Instead, their constitutionality is upheld only
by default-the Argersinger court having refused to consider the issue.
Even so, this argument is not without merit, for it accurately, though
narrowly, portrays the current status of the law.
A contrary approach would prohibit the collateral use of misdemean-
or convictions of uncounseled indigents who were not imprisoned. The
Argersinger Court's emphasis on loss of liberty supports this conclusion.
The Court could have framed a right to counse 74 but instead chose to
create a right not to be imprisoned without %representation at trial. It
would subvert the Court's purpose to allow imprisonment to result indi-
rectly from uncounseled misdemeanor trials, while at the same time dis-
of the status of a "repeat offender," they may be considered as representing the history
and character of the defendant in determining whether to impose imprisonment for the
present offense. See OHIO REV. CODE 2929.01(A) and 2929.22(A) (H.B. 511, f. 1-1-
1974). Other states grant similar discretion. See note 35 supra.
7 4 See note 24 supra.
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allowing imprisonment as a direct result of uncounseled misdemeanor
trials. Since the Court prohibited imprisonment based upon an unreli-
able conviction obtained at an unfair trial, the Court would probably
not permit unreliable trials to have a delayed impact resulting in impris-
onment. Therefore, following the Burgett, Tucker and Loper decisions,
whenever it can be shown that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
had a substantial effect on the loss of liberty, that is, imprisonment might
not have been imposed absent this prior misdemeanor conviction, grounds
for reconsideration of the sentence or revocation exist.
Support for this approach can be found in -the paradox which results
from rejection of any restrictions on the use of uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions outside the scope of Argersinger. Conviction for lesser of-
fenses would have an increased potential for a delayed impact on loss
of liberty than would conviction for more serious offenses." Persons
committing lesser offenses, convicted without counsel and given non-im-
prisonment sentences, would be subject to the future detrimental use of
such conviction which could ultimately result in imprisonment. Persons
committing more serious offenses, however, convicted without counsel
and sentenced to jail, would be immune from the future detrimental use
of this conviction.
There is, however, the Argersinger Court's concern about the effect
of its decision on the administration of justice. Requiring that any misde.
meanor conviction must be counseled in order for it to result, directly
or indirectly, - in loss of liberty effectively extends the right to counsel
in all misdemeanor cases. This is exactly what the Court refused to
do in Argersinger. The pre-trial problems would be magnified; in each
misdemeanor trial the decision whether to appoint counsel would have
to be made not only on the basis of whether imprisonment would be
an available sentencing alternative, but also on the basis of whether, if
convicted and only fined, the conviction would have a potential collateral
effect on liberty. Such a predetermination would be an administrative
nightmare and would in effect stimulate a general appointment of counsel
except for the most minor charges. Thus the apparent desire of the
Court to avoid the burden of a broad extension of the right to court-
appointed counsel would be severely compromised.
The resolution of these two conflicting points of view cannot come
from an analysis of Argersinger alone. The Court's use of imprisonment
to invoke the sixth amendment right to counsel created an imperfection
within Argersinger which allows the constitutionality of two similar trials
75 See United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 307-08 (1973) (Duncan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
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to be determined by the sentence imposed. Such a result illustrates that
Argersiger is based on a compromise rather than on sound principle. Be-
cause it provides no basis upon which to resolve conflicting application,
disparity among courts will be inevitable.
In Marston v. Oliver,8 the Fourth Circuit emphasized the Supreme
Court's concern that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction should not
result in imprisonment. The court stated, in dictum: "Argersinger pur-
ported to excise from the misdemeanor conviction only those conse-
quences that related to loss of liberty and imprisonment. So far as its
direct or collateral consequences are the loss of liberty on the part of
the defendant, Argersinger applies.. .. ,,77 Some other courts, however,
are likely to take the opposite view when faced with this issue.
The best resolution of the conflict created by the Supreme Court's
compromise between the necessity of counsel to insure a fair criminal
trial and the need for an orderly functioning of the criminal justice sys-
tem is the creation of an affirmative right to counsel for indigents charged
with a misdemeanor-a step which the Supreme Court refused to take
in Argersinger. The creation of such a right does present its own set
of problems. The most basic of these is the scope to be given it; whether
it should apply to all misdemeanor trials, or only to certain types. Some
commentators have suggested that a full right to counsel is constitutional-
ly required for all criminal prosecutions regardless of any readjustments
which would be necessary to offset the additional burden on the criminal
justice system.-, Others fear the detrimental impact of implementing
76 485 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1973).
77 Id. at 707. The court only discussed uncounseled misdemeanor convictions which
themselves resulted in imprisonment. Nevertheless, its reasoning implies application to un-
counseled misdemeanor convictions involving no imprisonment since the Fourth Circuit per-
ceived Argersinger to uphold the constitutionality of any uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tion. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
7 8 See, e.g., L. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR COURT, Ch. 4
(to be published, 1974). Professor Herman persuasively argues that the right to appointed
counsel is constitutionally guaranteed for all criminal prosecutions within the meaning of
the sixth amendment and should not be compromised because of the fear of a resulting
decrease in the quality of criminal justice. Although there will probably be some increase
in the number of misdemeanor cases tried, and there undoubtedly will be an increase in
lawyers needed, Professor Herman suggests that the extent of these burdens are not statistical-
ly forseeable based on present data. Nevertheless, he concludes that the ability of the courts
to handle misdemeanor cases in a timely fashion can be maintained through better judicial
administration, the diversion from the judicial process of cases which are punishable only
by a small fine, e.g., most traffic offenses, and the decriminalization of victimless crimes.
In addition, Professor Herman concludes that a structure is already available to provide
appointed counsel since the majority of states have provision for appointment of counsel
in at least certain types of misdemeanor cases and there are also legal aid and defender
agencies throughout the country. For these reasons, the burden of implementing a delivery
system for legal services is one of expansion, rather than creation, and therefore less severe.
Thus the unknown burdens of creating a full right to appointed counsel could be minimized
and are not a sufficient reason for denying constitutional rights. For further commentary
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a full right and propose various compromises.7 ' Insofar as Argersinger
itself represents a compromise it illustrates the difficulties to be encoun-
tered in attempting to frame a doctrine which distinguishes among un-
counseled misdemeanor trials in assessing their constitutionality. Thus
a full right to counsel may be the lesson to be learned from Argersinger.
Indeed, some courts have already begun to move in this direction. In
Wood v. Superintendent Caroline Correctional Unit, 0 a federal district
court applied the approach urged by Justice Powell in Argersinger:
"[T~he right to counsel in petty offense cases is not absolute but is one
to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on
a case-by-case basis." 8' Thus at least an initial step toward creating an
affirmative right to counsel in all misdemeanor cases was taken by the
Wood court.
IV. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RESTRICTIONS
ON COLLATERAL USE
This note has examined the extent to which the Argersinger decision
requires certain restrictions on the collateral use of uncounseled misde-
meanor convictions. Since Argersinger has been made retroactive, a cor-
ollary issue is whether this retroactivity extends so far as to affect collat-
eral uses which occurred at trials held previous to the Argersinger deci-
sion-June 12, 1972.
In an analogous situation, the restrictions developed following Gideon
have been applied retroactively. Although the trial in Burgett v. Texas"
occurred after Gideon, the Supreme Court in United States v. Tucker 8
and Loper v. Beto 4 applied restrictions on its use of invalid felony con-
victions to trials occurring prior to Gideon.8 The Tucker Court did not
specifically discuss the issue of retroactivity of collateral use, but this sub-
on the right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases see, e.g., Junker, The Right to
Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 685 (19)68); Kamisar & Chopcr, The
Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal Policy Observalions, 48
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1963); No:e, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Conniel, 55
IOWA L Rnv. 1248 (1970).
79 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972).
80 355 F. Supp. 338, 341-43 (E.D. Va. 1973). Contra, Rogers v, Slaughter, 469 F.2d
1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972).
81355 F. Supp. at 342, quoting from Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 63 (Powell,
J., concurring in the result).
82 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
83 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
84 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
85 Id. at 474. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 443-44.
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ject generated divergent opinions in Loper.88 The plurality opinion, by
Justice Stewart, summarily rejected any proposal that the Burgett restric-
tions on collateral use should be applied only to trials occurring subse-
quent to Gideon;87 it viewed proscriptions on the collateral use of convic-
tions as developed in Burgett and Tucker to be constitutionally required
by Gideon.8 8 Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, however, viewed the
retroactive application of the Burgett restrictions on collateral use as an
independent question."' He considered the detrimental effect of such re-
troactive application-that many convictions would become vulnerable to
attack, and thus diminish the finality of judgments°°--and concluded
that: "Neither fundamental fairness nor any specific constitutional provi-
sion requires that a rule of evidence be made retroactive; consideration
for the orderly administration of justice dictates the contrary."'
Because Loper was decided only two years ago, and because it was
a plurality decision, it leaves unsettled the question of retroactivity of
collateral use. The decision in Loper is authority favoring such retroac-
tivity even for misdemeanor convictions. Applying the plurality's anal-
ysis, any collateral use which is constitutionally prohibited by the Court's
holding in Argersinger was made retroactive when Argersinger itself was
made retroactive in Berry v. Cincinnati."2 Thus collateral use of uncoun-
seled misdemeanor convictions which resulted in loss of liberty should
be retroactively restricted. Further, uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tions, involving no loss of liberty in themselves, should be retroactively
restricted, if they will indirectly result in loss of liberty.
This analysis gains support from language in Berry. After stating
that, "[T]hose convicted prior to the decision in Argersinger are entitled
to the constitutional rule enunciated in that case . . . ," the Court cited
Burgett." Since Burgett involved the collateral use of felony convictions
invalidated by Gideon it might be concluded that restrictions similar to
those applied in Burgett are part of the "constitutional rule" of Arger-
singer. If so, then such restrictions were made retroactive by Berry.
If the Court should refuse, however, to apply Loper to Argersinger,
the decision to make Argersinger retroactive would have no bearing on
the decision whether to make any restrictions on the collateral use of
86 See generally 1 WAsR. U. L. Q. 197, 209-12 (1973).
8 7 Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. at 484 n.13.
s8d. at 483-84.
89 Id. at 492 (Burger, (CJ., dissenting).
90 Id. at 491, 494 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
91 Id. at 493 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
92 414 U.S. 29 (1973).
93ld.
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uncounseled misdemeanor convictions also retroactive. A separate anal-
ysis would have to be made, as suggested by the dissent in Loper. Under
such an analysis, it would probably be concluded that restrictions on col-
lateral use to impeach a defendant's testimony should only be applied
prospectively since retroactivity of a rule of evidence would require new
trials which, for persons convicted many years ago, would be a practical
impossibility. Thus there would be a detrimental effect on the adminis-
tration of justice. Even under this analysis, however, it could be argued
that other restrictions on collateral use of prior misdemeanor convictions
-to enhance punishment or to revoke probation, parole, or a suspended
sentence-shuld be made retroactive. In these cases only a resentencing
would be required. Thus such retroactive application does not create
the severe hardship on the administration of justice that the retroactive
application of the proscription against use to impeach testimony does."
V. CONCLUSION
Argersinger v. Hamlin enunciated a new rule of criminal procedure:
no indigent may be imprisoned without representation by counsel at trial.
Although based on an analysis that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions
are unreliable because they stem from unfair trials, the Court created
sentencing restrictions rather than a right to counsel. As a result of
this compromise, Argersinger contains some logical flaws, not all of
which can be resolved. An attempt to determine whether Argersinger
mandates any restrictions on the collateral use of uncounseled misde-
meanor convictions emphasizes the unprincipled nature of the case.
Based on the analysis that Argersinger applies to both the conviction
and the sentence, the collateral use of any misdemeanor conviction, inval-
id under Argersinger, should be restricted. Such restrictions are man-
dated by the premise of the Argersinger conclusion that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction which results in imprisonment is an unreliable
determination of guilt because it stems from an unfair trial. Thus collat-
eral use of misdemeanor convictions invalidated by Argersinger should
not be allowed to enhance punishment for a different offense, to justify
revocation of parole, probation or a suspended sentence, or to impeach
defendant's testimony in a trial for a different offense. Further, these
restrictions should be applied retroactively since they are mandated by
Argersinger, which itself has been retroactively appjied in Berry v. COn-
cinnati.
o Although Justice Burger, dissenting in Loper, criticized retroactively applying restrc.




A further issue, also not discussed by the Court, is whether uncoun-
seled misdemeanor convictions involving no loss of liberty, and therefore
not controlled by Argersinger, may be used collaterally to have the de-
layed effect of imprisonment. For example, the imposition of imprison-
ment at a counseled trial may be directly attributable to a previous un-
counseled misdemeanor conviction. In this type of situation, arguments
both for and against restrictions on collateral use find support in Arger-
singer. The Court's focus on loss of liberty to invoke the right to court-
appointed counsel seems to favor restrictions. At the same time, how-
ever, the constitutionality of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions, along
with the Court's apparent effort to reduce as much as possible any detri-
mental impact on the administration of justice, would support rejection
of any restrictions. Thus the flaws within Argersinger become apparent
and no resolution of this issue can be drawn from the case.
Creation of an affirmative right to court appointed counsel for indi-
gents charged with a misdemeanor is the best solution to the imperfec-
tions of Argersinger. Although the Supreme Court refused to do so in
Argersinger, its compromise has only created ambiguity and uncertainty.
As a result, there will be increasing demand for some further explanation
of Argersinger. The best explanation is to abandon its illogical doctrine
and create a right to counsel which is not illusory.
Barbara Bison Ford
